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Academic Freedom in K-12 Education
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of "academic freedom" is part of the culture of Ameri-
can education. But what are the legal contours of this principle? And,
what protections do K-12 teachers actually enjoy in their schools and
classrooms?
For purposes of this article, "academic freedom" will mean the
First Amendment protections of professional discretion that a public
school teacher may exercise in the course of performing his or her
teaching functions. As used here, "academic freedom" does not include
the First Amendment rights enjoyed by all public employees "to speak
out, as a citizen, on matters of public concern,"1 at least when those
rights are exercised outside the school environment.
The discussion that follows will focus on academic freedom in K-12
schools. It must be recognized, however, that much of the case law
positing principles of academic freedom has been generated by dis-
putes arising in the arena of higher education, and some of those cases
will be noted in the first part of the discussion that follows. 2
II. THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Endorsing the Concept
The Supreme Court has provided ringing endorsements of the gen-
eral concept of "academic freedom" in reference to higher education.
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,3 the Court stated:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is al-
most self-evident.... To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual lead-
ers in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation....
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Educational Administration, University of Nebraska-Lin-
coln. University of Nebraska-Lincoln, J.D., 1979; Ph.D., 1980.
1. Faerber v. City of Newport, 51 F. Supp.2d 115, 120 (D.R.I. 1999)(discussing the
First Amendment right of public employees to speak out on matters of public
concern).
2. An extensive discussion of academic freedom that includes both K-12 and post-
secondary education cases is provided in W. Stuart Stuller, High School Aca-
demic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REv. 301 (1998).
3. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die.
4
And in Keyishian v. Board of Regents5 the Court stated:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
6
Locus of Academic Freedom
The "essential freedoms" of the academy were delineated in this
often-cited passage from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy:
It is the business of a university to provide an atmosphere most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there pre-
vail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university - to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study.7
At least one lower court has thought this principle applicable to K-
12 education. In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,8 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that these "four essen-
tial freedoms" should also apply to public schools, "unless quite im-
practicable or contrary to law."9
As the language in these excerpts implies, the benefits of "aca-
demic freedom" is vested in the academy, not in the academicians. In
fact, educational institutions enjoy an "academic freedom" that is in
some ways at odds with the notion of a teacher's "academic freedom"
in the classroom. As the Court noted in another higher education
case, "[alcademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also,
and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the
academy itself."xo
Urofsky v. Gilmore,'1 another higher education case, provided a
thorough review of the history and constitutional dimensions of "aca-
demic freedom." The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that "to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of
'academic freedom' above and beyond the First Amendment rights to
which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not
in individual professors. 12
4. Id. at 250.
5. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
6. Id. at 603.
7. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfirter, J., concurring)(emphasis added).
8. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998).
9. Id. at 370.
10. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n. 12 (1985)(internal cita-
tions omitted).
11. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
12. Id. at 410.
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That the academy, not the academician, is the locus of "academic
freedom" is borne out by the majority of cases. Nevertheless, as will
be discussed below, a teacher's in-school expression does sometimes
enjoy a modicum of constitutional protection.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTOURS OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM EXPRESSED
This part sets out the constitutional contours of "academic free-
dom" in K-12 education. The intent is to provide a framework of basic
principles that can be applied by both attorneys and educators.
Authority of School Officials
The Supreme Court has often acknowledged the power of the state
and of school district boards and administrators to exercise reasonable
control over curriculum, instruction, and other school activities. This
power is, however, subject to constitutional constraints.
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the
Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. Our courts, however,
have not failed to apply the First Amendment's mandate in our educational
system where essential to safeguard the fundamental values of freedom of
speech, inquiry and belief. By and large, public education in our Nation is
committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and can-
not intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of
school systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitu-
tional values. On the other hand, "[tihe vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. 13
"[L]ocal school boards must be permitted to establish and apply
their curriculum in such a way as to transmit community values, and
there is a legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting
respect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or
political."14 At the same time, however, the discretion of the States
and local school boards in matters of education must be exercised in a
manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First
Amendment.15
Role of Teachers
Although the Supreme Court has noted "[t]he State's undoubted
right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools,"16 it has also
13. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)(citation omitted)(brackets in
original).
14. Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 1443, 1452
(M.D.N.C. 1995).
15. See Board of Educ. of Island Trees Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869
(1982)(Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
16. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107.
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acknowledged the important role that teachers play in delivering that
curriculum to the students.
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in developing
students' attitude toward government and understanding of the role of citi-
zens in our society. Alone among employees of the system, teachers are in
direct, day-to-day contact with students both in the classrooms and in the
other varied activities of a modem school. In shaping the students' experience
to achieve educational goals, teachers, by necessity, have wide discretion over
the way the course material is communicated to students. They are responsi-
ble for presenting and explaining the subject matter in a way that is both
comprehensible and inspiring.17
Public school teachers do enjoy the protections of the Constitution
in their employment setting. "First Amendment rights, applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are
available to teachers and students."1s However, teachers' speech in
the role of "teacher" is, in certain contexts, subject to school control. If
school facilities are not open for "indiscriminate use by the general
public," then the school is not a public forum and "school officials may
impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and
other members of the school community."' 9
A First Amendment Right
As noted in the introduction, "academic freedom" is not an inde-
pendent constitutional right. Instead of positing a new, distinct right
of academic freedom grounded in the Constitution, courts analyze aca-
demic freedom cases as free speech claims, though in a distinct set of
contexts and therefore implicating a distinct set of rules.2 0
In evaluating a teacher's First Amendment claim, a federal district
court used the term "academic expression" rather than "academic free-
dom."21 This terminology may prove to be a useful denotation of
teacher expression that may enjoy some constitutional protection.
Some courts have stated that, at least to some extent, the First
Amendment protects a teacher's classroom discussion.22 For example,
17. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979).
18. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)(emphasis
added).
19. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988)(emphasis added).
20. See Hosford v. School Comm. of Sandwich, 659 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Mass. 1996);
see also Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991).
21. Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 771, 775 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
22. See Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir.
1980)(discussing how an instructor's "classroom discussion is protected activity");
Krizek v. Cicero-Stickney Township High Sch. Dist. 201, 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1137
(N.D. I1M. 1989)(discussing how individual teachers must be given some measure
of academic freedom to "develop inquisitive minds and independent thought."
However, this freedom must be balanced with the second function of the public
school system, which is to "provide intellectual and moral guidance," and to
"transmit[ ] the mores of the community.").
959
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school boards may not fire teachers for random classroom com-
ments. 23 Other courts have gone farther, suggesting that a teacher's
First Amendment rights encompass the notion of "academic freedom"
to exercise professional judgment in selecting topics and materials for
use in the course of the educational process. 24
In some of the cases noted immediately above, the courts did not
reach the essential issue of the extent of substantive First Amend-
ment protections, determining that the selection of curricular topics 2 5
or instructional materials 26 was not intended to send any particular-
ized message and thus was not constitutionally protected expression.
Instead, these actions by the teachers constituted conduct not pro-
tected by the First Amendment.
In other cases, teachers failed to clear the threshold into the realm
of constitutional protection when their in-school speech was deemed
not to be on a "matter of public concern." 27 Thus, the speech was
viewed as a private employment issue, no balancing test was invoked,
and school officials were never put to the test of justifying their
actions.28
In summary, much of this judicial discussion of "academic free-
dom" and teachers' First Amendment rights in the classroom has been
more rhetoric than reality. In most instances, teachers who invoke
these protections have not been successful.
School Authority and Teacher Rights
In disputes between school officials and teachers arising over "aca-
demic freedom" or "freedom of expression" in the classroom, courts
have consistently supported the authority of boards and administra-
tors to exercise reasonable control over teachers and their teaching.
Put simply, in matters of curriculum and instruction, teachers do not
enjoy any meaningful constitutional rights in the educational setting.
23. But see Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir.
1980)("But nothing in the Constitution permits the courts to interfere with local
educational discretion until local authorities begin to substitute rigid and exclu-
sive indoctrination for the mere exercise of their prerogative to make pedagogic
choices regarding matters of legitimate dispute.").
24. See Fowler v. Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1987).
25. See Cockrel, 81 F. Supp. at 775 (holding that teacher's selection of industrial
hemp as part of curriculum not an exercise of First Amendment rights).
26. See Fowler, 819 F.2d at 663 (holding that teacher's showing of film containing
violence and nudity to students ranging in age from 14-17 was not intended to
convey a particularized message and thus was not a forum of expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment).
27. Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998); Kirk-
land v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1989); Schul v.
Sherard, 102 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
28. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
960 [Vol. 79:956
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Local authorities have broad discretion in selecting teachers, regu-
lating their pedagogical methods, and choosing a suitable curricu-
lum.2 9 Furthermore, school officials have authority to require the
obedience of subordinate employees, including classroom teachers.30
In matters of curriculum, courts have always acknowledged the au-
thority of state and local school officials,31 thus leaving teachers little
individual discretion about course content. As explained by the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Parents have a vital interest in what their children are taught. Their repre-
sentatives have in general prescribed a curriculum. There is a compelling
state interest in the choice and adherence to a suitable curriculum for the
benefit of our young citizens and society. It cannot be left to individual teach-
ers to teach what they please. 32
Not only is it within the power of the school board to determine
what shall be taught, but how it shall be taught.3 3 For example, a
teacher dismissed for insubordination had no constitutional right to
persist in a course of teaching behavior that contravened the specific
directive of her principal.34 Nor do teachers have any First Amend-
ment right to determine what instructional materials to use.3 5
No court has found that public school teachers' First Amendment
rights extend to choosing their own curriculum or classroom manage-
ment techniques in contravention of school policy or dictates. Al-
though teachers' out-of-class conduct, including their advocacy of
particular teaching methods, is protected by the Constitution, their in-
class pedagogical method is not protected by academic freedom.36
Forum Analysis
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,37 the Supreme Court
made clear that school facilities that have been reserved for educa-
tional purposes are not "public forums," and "school officials may im-
pose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and
other members of the school community."3s And, because a school dis-
29. See Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 699 (Colo. 1998)(citing Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987)).
30. See Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1007 (7th Cir.
1990).
31. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).
32. Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1979).
33. See Newton v. Slye, 116 F. Supp. 2d 677, 686 (W.D. Va. 2000).
34. See Ahera v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399, 403-04 (8th Cir. 1972).
35. See Fisher v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 704 P.2d 213, 217 (Alaska
1985).
36. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990).
37. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
38. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
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trict classroom is not a public forum, a teacher's classroom speech is
also subject to reasonable regulation.3 9
Legitimate Pedagogical Concern
Hazelwood held that "educators do not offend the First Amend-
ment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of stu-
dent speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 40
A number of lower courts have extended the reach of this decision to
include a teacher's classroom expression, upholding the authority of
school officials to regulate a teacher's speech if the decision to impose
that regulation is grounded in a "legitimate pedagogical concern."41
The requirement of a "reasonable relationship" may not be a defini-
tively clear standard, but on the other hand it is not difficult to satisfy.
Whether a regulation is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns "will depend on, among other things, the age and sophistica-
tion of the students, the relationship between teaching method and
valid educational objective, and the context and manner of the
presentation."4 2
The implicit assumption of the principle set out in these cases
seems to be that even if the teacher's expression may have otherwise
enjoyed some constitutional protection, the "legitimate pedagogical
concern" underlying the board's decision permitted the board's regula-
tion of the teacher's expression to pass constitutional muster.
School Policies
If school officials do choose to exercise their authority to regulate
teachers' choices about curriculum content, instructional materials, or
teaching methods, then they should have in place appropriate policies
and procedures. 43 On the other hand, the Supreme Court did note in
Hazelwood that to require that specific written regulations be in place
39. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452-53 (1st Cir. 1993); California Teachers
Ass'n v. Davis, 64 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd.
of Pub. Educ., 919 F. Supp. 838, 844 (W.D. Pa. 1996).
40. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
41. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 367-68 (4th Cir.
1998); Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-21, 47 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir.
1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 723-
24 (2d Cir. 1994); Board of Educ. of Jefferson County v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695,
700-02 (Colo. 1998).
42. Silano, 42 F.3d at 722-23 (quoting Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir.
1993)).
43. See, e.g., Kirkland, v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir.
1989); Krizek v. Cicero-Stickney Township High Sch. Dist. No. 201, 713 F. Supp
1131, 1139 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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for regulating the curriculum could unduly constrain the ability of ed-
ucators to educate.44
Adequate Notice
Closely related to the notion of having appropriate rules in place is
the idea that school officials must provide teachers with adequate no-
tice of what speech-related conduct is prohibited. 4 5 Regulations re-
stricting classroom speech are constitutional insofar as they are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, provided that
those who may choose to speak are given appropriate notice of what
sorts of expressive conduct are out of bounds. But schools are not re-
quired to expressly prohibit every imaginable inappropriate conduct
by teachers; the standard requires only that teachers be able reasona-
bly to predict the types of conduct that are prohibited.46 The relevant
inquiry is whether, based on existing regulations, policies, discus-
sions, and other forms of communication between administrators and
teachers, it was reasonable for the school to expect the teacher to
know that the conduct at issue was prohibited.47
Due process principles are satisfied as long as the notice is reason-
ably calculated to reach the intended party. When statutory require-
ments are at issue, parties receive adequate notice through
publication. Similarly, insofar as published policies and regulations
are concerned, teachers are presumed to know the standards that gov-
ern their conduct. Thus, a teacher is not entitled to actual notice of a
school district's policy; rather, a teacher is entitled to reasonable no-
tice, which may be accomplished through publication.48 For example,
a state statute permitting termination of a teacher for "conduct un-
becoming a teacher" furnished sufficient notice that an indecent mes-
sage directed to a student was impermissible.4 9
In addition to statutes and policies, there are certain steps that
administrators can take to insure that teachers receive adequate no-
tice of proscribed speech or conduct. For example, a principal's memo-
randum can give teachers clear written notice that school rules will
indeed be enforced. And, even where a requirement of a rule has been
waived, the requirement may be reinstated by giving notice to other
party.5 0 Finally, the sufficiency of notice is reinforced when an admin-
44. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 (1988); see also Silano, 42 F.3d at 723 (citing Hazel-
wood's proposition that requiring regulations in the context of a curricular activ-
ity could unduly constrain the ability of educators to educate).
45. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir. 1993).
46. See Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 1999).
47. See Ward, 996 F.2d at 454.
48. See Board ofEduc. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 705-06 (Colo. 1998).
49. Conward, 171 F.3d at 23.
50. See Fisher v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 704 P.2d 213, 215 (Alaska
1985).
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istrator provides oral notice to a teacher that school rules prohibit cer-
tain kinds of expression. 5 '
Vagueness and Overbreadth
School district policies regulating teachers' classroom speech are
sometimes challenged as being unconstitutionally "vague" or "over-
broad." Overly vague laws are unconstitutional because they fail to
provide fair notice of what conduct is prohibited and they invite arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement. A law is unconstitutionally
overbroad if it burdens speech protected by the First Amendment; fur-
thermore, the burden on protected speech must be substantial as com-
pared with the burden on unprotected speech.5 2 Finally, the principle
of adequate notice is embodied in the concept that "a rule that forbids
the doing of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelli-
gence must guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application
violates due process."53
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONTOURS OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM APPLIED
This part provides a discussion of cases in which constitutional
contours of "academic freedom" have been applied to the act of teach-
ing in K-12 schools. The sections are organized according to the gen-
eral legal principles that the courts found controlling.
The first three sections provide examples of situations in which
teachers prevailed in their challenges to school authority. The re-
maining sections show the more common outcome of school authority
prevailing over teacher rights. Cases are noted so as to describe the
factual situations involved.
Inadequate Notice
Several early cases seemed to extend the protection of "academic
freedom" to classroom teachers in a meaningful way. It is interesting
to observe that all four cases noted below involved the use of language
generally deemed inappropriate in a school setting.
o "Academic freedom" protected the tenured teacher of a senior
English class from being dismissed for assigning an article that in-
cluded "a vulgar term for an incestuous son" and then discussing the
51. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 723-24 (8th Cir.
1998).
52. See generally Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 702-05 (Colo. 1998)(provid-
ing a discussion on the doctrines of "overbreadth" and "vagueness").
53. Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1177 (3d Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 79:956
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article and the word in class; however, the court also noted that he
had no adequate notice that this conduct would be prohibited. 54
0 School officials had failed to show either that a short story with
some vulgar terms was an inappropriate assignment for high school
juniors or that it created a significant disruption to the educational
process; furthermore, given that there was no written or announced
policy prohibiting the use of such material, an English teacher's dis-
missal for making this assignment was an unwarranted invasion of
her First Amendment right to academic freedom. 5 5
* A teacher of eleventh-grade English was discharged for writing
the "F" word on the chalkboard as an example of a "taboo" word. Al-
though not clear whether or not this teaching methodology was pro-
tected by the concepts of free speech and academic freedom,
procedural due process required that the teacher could not be dis-
charged unless the state could prove that he had reasonable notice,
either by regulation or otherwise, that he should not use that
method.56 The court of appeals affirmed, finding that a statement in
the Code of Ethics relied on by school officials was impermissibly
vague, and thus a violation of due process. 57
* A high school drama teacher was exercising academic freedom
by employing methods of teaching reasonably relevant to the subject
matter she taught, and the Constitution protected her from dismissal
for choosing plays that included scenes with drinking and profanity,
when there were no school rules or other prior notice that such plays
were not alowed.58
Each of these cases seemed to extend some measure of substantive
constitutional protection to a teacher's classroom speech. But in every
instance, the fact that the school had not provided adequate notice of
proscribed conduct was a major factor in the decision.
Protecting the Educational System
Beginning in the 1970s and extending through the 1990s, some
courts clearly extended First Amendment rights to teachers in school
district classrooms to protect them from adverse employment actions.
In each of the cases noted in this section, however, freedom of expres-
sion and/or academic freedom was invoked at least in part to protect
the internal educational processes from the influence of external dis-
approval by parents or community.
54. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969).
55. See Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 356 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
56. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971).
57. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242, 1243 (1st Cir. 1971).
58. See Webb v. Lake Mills Community Sch. Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 799-800 (N.D.
Iowa 1972).
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o A high school teacher was denied the proper exercise of his right
of free speech when he was discharged for discussing controversial po-
litical and social issues in his political science and civics classes.59
* The act of teaching is a form of expression, and the methods
used are media; a high school teacher's use of outside speakers in his
political science class was his medium for teaching, and thus protected
by the First Amendment. An order issued by a board of education
banning "all political speakers" was not a reasonable restriction of the
teacher's protected expression. 60
o A public school teacher has a First Amendment right to aca-
demic freedom to use a teaching method of his or her own choosing,
even though the subject matter may be controversial and sensitive.
Thus, absent material or substantial disruption in the school, a
teacher could not be dismissed for using in her high school speech and
psychology classes a survey from a magazine that included items
about sexually explicit matters.6 i
* A nontenured American history teacher could not be dismissed
for using a simulation technique that evoked strong student feelings
on racial issues to teach about the Reconstruction period. The First
Amendment protects classroom discussion, and the discharge could
not be upheld absent a finding that the controversial discussions over-
balanced her usefulness as a teacher. 62
* After public protests about the content of his seventh grade life
science course, a teacher was suspended, then discharged, even
though the school board had approved the textbook and the principal
had approved the films. The teacher's exercise of academic freedom
had followed rather than violated his superior's instructions, and his
First Amendment rights were violated by the adverse personnel
actions. 63
Although none of these decisions turned on the fact that outside
forces were at play, that situation was noted with a sense of disap-
proval in each opinion. It was as if the courts believed that it was in
the best interests of education to protect school officials from their
own folly.
59. See generally Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex.
1972), vacated and remanded on issue of appropriate remedy, 496 F.2d 92 (5th
Cir. 1974).
60. Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F. Supp. 1358, 1364 (D. Or. 1976).
61. See Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 308 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
62. See Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980).
63. See Stachura v. Memphis Community Sch. Dist., 763 F.2d 211, 215 (6th Cir.
1985), rev'd and remanded on issue of damages, 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
[Vol. 79:956
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Protecting the Teacher
In two instances, however, academic freedom, or freedom of speech,
provided substantive constitutional protection to teachers in their K-
12 classrooms. Although neither a notice issue nor an external influ-
ence issue was a factor in either case, the first turned on a separate
constitutional issue and the second was probably an example of hard
facts leading to an anomalous decision.
* A probationary art teacher enjoyed constitutional protections to
freedom of expression such that she could not be dismissed for refus-
ing to comply with a school regulation that required her to participate
with her high school class in the pledge of allegiance. 64 In this case,
however, the acknowledged constitutional right not to be forced to
practice an idea contrary to one's belief was determinative.
* A nontenured special needs teacher in a junior high school who
invoked the concept of academic freedom was protected from "arbi-
trary and capricious" employment sanctions for having discussed with
three male students in a resource room a number of vulgar words with
multiple meanings. School officials contended that she had used bad
judgment, but the court found that the discussion of the words was
pedagogically valid and that she had in fact admonished the students
not to use such words.65 Even in this case, however, the court noted
that had there been in place a school policy banning any articulation
of such words in the classroom the teacher would have been bound to
respect it.66
The paucity of cases in which a teacher has successfully challenged
the power of school officials to control classroom expression leads to
the conclusion that "academic freedom" as a stand-alone constitu-
tional protection is not a reality for teachers. The cases discussed in
the ensuing sections provide abundant proof of judicial affirmation of
school authority.
First Amendment Protections Acknowledged, but School Authority
Prevails
A number of courts, while expressing the view that teachers do en-
joy some First Amendment protections in their classrooms, have nev-
ertheless denied teachers the benefit of that protection. In each case
noted in this section, the court saw fit simply to affirm the school's
authority.
64. See Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
65. See Hosford v. School Comm. of Sandwich, 659 N.E.2d 1178, 1182-83 (Mass.
1996).
66. See id. at 1182.
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Two cases from the 1990s involved a conflict between a teacher's
religious views and a school's legitimate interest in curriculum. In
each instance, the court acknowledged that the teacher's interest was
entitled to constitutional protection, but cited Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District6 7 for the proposition that in
public education an individual's right to free speech is not absolute
and may be limited if exercise of that right interferes with the rights
of others.
o Establishment Clause considerations led to the conclusion that
the school district's removal of two Christian books from classroom
shelves and a directive ordering a teacher to cease his silent Bible
reading in the classroom did not violate his First Amendment rights to
self-expression and academic freedom in the classroom.6 8
o A school district requirement that a high school biology teacher
teach the theory of evolution was not a violation of his First Amend-
ment right to free speech. 69
As noted above, where issues of curriculum and instruction have
been involved, teachers consistently have lost their challenges to
school authority. Especially in matters of program content, the au-
thority of the school is never questioned. And, while courts have given
a respectful nod to the notion that a teacher should have some range
of freedom in classroom instructional practices, that has been a hollow
promise.
o Although the concept of academic freedom has been recognized
in our jurisprudence, it has never conferred on teachers control of pub-
lic school curricula. 70
o Public school teachers undoubtedly have some freedom in the
techniques to be employed, but they do not have an unlimited liberty
protected by the First Amendment to discuss controversial subjects
and to use controversial materials in their courses. 71
o Teachers do have some rights to freedom of expression in the
classroom, and they cannot be made to simply read from a script pre-
pared or approved by the board; however, no "right of academic free-
dom" prevents a board from deleting 10 books from a reading list
including 1,275 other titles approved for use in high school language
arts courses. 72
o Although teachers should have some measure of freedom in
teaching techniques employed, course content and coverage is mani-
67. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
68. See Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 505
U.S. 1218 (1992).
69. See Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 782 F. Supp. 1412 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
70. See Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989).
71. See Adams v. Campbell County Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 1975).
72. Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 542 (10th Cir. 1979).
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festly a matter within a school board's discretion. Because high school
teachers' method of team teaching history affected course content, re-
strictions imposed did not violate their right to academic freedom. 73
* A school newspaper advisor did not have a personal First
Amendment right to encourage publication of controversial articles.
After balancing the interests of the teacher and the interests of the
school, the court concluded that the interests of the school in main-
taining a harmonious workplace prevailed. 74
- In denying a teacher's motion for a preliminary injunction, the
court balanced her First Amendment rights to classroom expression
and the school's right to control curriculum. Because of the extent of
the vulgarity and sexual explicitness in a film that the teacher showed
to her high school English class, she was unlikely to be able to demon-
strate that the decision to not renew her contract was unreasonable. 75
Forum Analysis
Recognizing that a typical public school classroom is not a "public
forum," courts have required schools to satisfy only a test of "reasona-
bleness" in regulating classroom expression. But requiring school offi-
cials to meet even this minimal standard does imply that a teacher's
classroom expression enjoys at least some modest constitutional
protection.
- For First Amendment purposes, a teacher's expression in a
traditional classroom setting must be treated as school-sponsored ex-
pression in a nonpublic forum; thus, the teacher of a ninth-grade gov-
ernment class had no constitutional right-based on academic
freedom or anything else-that protected his substantiation in class of
a rumor about inappropriate student behavior.76
* The prohibition of a teacher's use in her classrooms of a certain
game as a motivational technique was not in violation of the First
Amendment. High school classrooms are nonpublic fora, and the
school's restriction on teacher's speech satisfied the test of
reasonableness. 7 7
- A teacher was not free to post material that contradicted board
policy regarding tolerance of gays and lesbians. Bulletin boards were
school's speech, not teachers. A school's control of its own speech in a
nonpublic forum is not subject to the constraints of constitutional safe-
guards and forum analysis, but instead is measured by practical con-
73. See Millikin v. Board of Dir., 611 P.2d 414, 417-18 (Wash. 1980).
74.' See Nicholson v. Board of Educ. Torrance Unified Sch. Dist., 682 F.2d 858 (9th
Cir. 1982).
75. See Krizek v. Cicero-Stickney Township High Sch. Dist. No. 201, 713 F. Supp.
1131 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
76. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
77. See Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 919 F. Supp. 838 (W.D. Pa. 1996).
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siderations applicable to any individual's choice of how to convey
oneself: among other things, content, timing, and purpose. When the
State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices. A school
board may decide to advocate for a point of view and restrict the con-
trary speech of one of its representatives.T8
Legitimate Pedagogical Concerns
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier79 held that educators may
exercise editorial control over student speech in school-sponsored ac-
tivities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.8 0 Some lower courts have extended the consti-
tutional underpinnings of that holding to encompass a teacher's class-
room activities. But although the burden of justification in such cases
is modest indeed, courts will look for an educational rationale, and
school officials should be prepared to provide one.
- A school board policy prohibiting profanity in the classroom was
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concern of promoting
generally acceptable social standards, and teacher had adequate no-
tice of that policy; thus, the First Amendment did not prevent her dis-
missal for violating school policy by allowing students in her high
school English classes to use profanity in their creative written
work.81
e A school district's policy regarding classroom use of controversial
materials was reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,
and teacher had no First Amendment right to use nonapproved con-
troversial learning resources in his high school classroom without first
obtaining administrative approval as the policy required.8 2
- A volunteer lecturer (a retired filmmaker, who happened to be a
school board member) had no First Amendment right to show film
clips with photographs of bare-chested women to tenth-grade mathe-
matics students during a lecture on the scientific phenomenon of "per-
sistence of vision." Given that the disputed film clip was entirely
unnecessary to the subject matter of his lecture, school officials had a
legitimate pedagogical purpose in restricting the display of these pho-
tographs in this classroom setting.8 3
78. See Downs v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000).
79. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
80. See id. at 273.
81. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir.
1998).
82. See Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 701-02 (Colo. 1998).
83. See Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 721-23
(2d Cir. 1994).
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No First Amendment Protections Acknowledged
In a series of cases that began about 1970, courts determined that
First Amendment protections simply did not apply to teachers' expres-
sive activities in the classroom. At issue in this set of cases were cur-
riculum content and instructional practices.
In two Seventh Circuit cases, the courts took the position that a
teacher's religious interests were not protected by the First Amend-
ment and never reached any balancing of the interests, simply af-
firming the authority of school officials to control curriculum.
* A probationary kindergarten teacher had no constitutional right
to disregard the prescribed curriculum concerning patriotic matters,
on the claimed grounds that conforming to the curriculum would con-
flict with her religious principles.8 4
* Given the school board's important pedagogical interest in estab-
lishing curriculum and legitimate concern with possible Establish-
ment Clause violations, its prohibition on the teaching of "creation
science" to junior high students was appropriate and did not violate
the teacher's First Amendment rights.8 5
In like fashion, many other courts denied teachers any constitu-
tional protected interests in their classroom expression by simply af-
firming the authority of school officials over matters of curriculum and
instruction.
e A high school economics teacher, who implemented a philosophy
that allowed students to make many decisions about subjects for daily
discussion, course materials, and classroom rules, was dismissed for
insubordination. Her "academic freedom" claim failed because she
had no constitutional right to persist in a course of teaching behavior
that contravened her employer's valid dictates regarding appropriate
classroom methods or content.8 6
* A teacher had no right, under the principle of academic freedom
or any other theory, to require eleven-year-old girls to write a very
vulgar word repeatedly and in the presence of their classmates as a
form of punishment.s 7
* Teachers' claim that their dismissals for distributing to eighth
grade students a brochure with an inappropriate poem violated their
right to academic freedom failed; the reach of the First Amendment
does not extend so far that the school board had to tolerate the distri-
bution of obviously inappropriate material.8 8
84. See Palmer v. Board of Educ., 603 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1979).
85. See Webster v. New Lennox Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990).
86. See Ahern v. Board of Educ., 456 F.2d 399, 403-04 (8th Cir. 1972).
87. See Celestine v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd., 284 So. 2d 650, 655 (La. App. 1973).
88. See Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
o A tenured high school teacher had no First Amendment right to
use a book that school officials would not approve for use in teaching a
unit on homosexual rights in his American Minorities course.8 9
o A teacher had no right of academic freedom that extended to her
choice of Learnball classroom management techniques; the school had
banned its use because it was not an appropriate pedagogical
method.90
o Teachers do not have a First Amendment right to be free of regu-
lations that tell them to follow a method of instruction or a curricu-
lum, and the state can dictate to teachers that they must teach in
English.91
Conduct, Not Expression
There have been cases where teachers contended that certain
classroom conduct was constitutionally protected speech, but the
courts determined that the conduct at issue was not a form of expres-
sion for First Amendment purposes.
o A teacher's First Amendment rights encompass the notion of "ac-
ademic freedom" to exercise professional judgment in selecting topics
and materials for use in the educational process. However, a teacher's
showing of a film containing violence and nudity to high school classes
on a noninstructional day was not done to convey any message and
thus did not constitute expression protected by the First
Amendment.92
o Because a teacher's refusal to assign a grade as instructed by his
superiors is not a teaching method, it is neither a principle of aca-
demic freedom nor a matter of public concern. Thus, adverse employ-
ment actions imposed on a high school mathematics teacher for
refusing to assign an athlete a grade was not a violation of his First
Amendment rights.93
o A teacher's presentation to her fifth grade class of segment on
industrial hemp as part of her curriculum was conduct that did not
constitute an exercise of her First Amendment rights.94
o A male teacher's handing an "Application for a Piece of Ass" to a
female student in a study hall was not constitutionally protected ex-
pression. Although the teacher claimed that his intent was to suggest
that swear words were inappropriate, this was not the kind of expres-
89. See Fisher v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 704 P.2d 213 (Alaska
1985).
90. See Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990).
91. See California Teachers Ass'n v. Davis, 64 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953-54 (C.D. Cal.
1999).
92. See Fowler v. Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1987).
93. See Bates v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 952 S.W.2d 543, 549 (Tex. App. 1997).
94. See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
[Vol. 79:956
20001 ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN K-12 EDUCATION 973
sive conduct that was intended to convey a particular message under
circumstances that the message would have been so understood by the
adolescent recipient reading the lascivious content. 95
Not a Matter of Public Concern
Courts tend to view a teacher's choice of curricular materials or
instructional methodology as being an internal matter relating to em-
ployment, rather than "speech on a matter of public concern." Thus,
there is no need to balance the interests of the school and the interests
of the teacher.
* The First Amendment did not empower a public high school his-
tory teacher to use his own supplemental reading list, instead of the
list approved by school officials. Because the teacher's use of his sepa-
rate reading list was not a matter of public concern, the inquiry here
did not advance to a balancing of the interests of the teacher and the
interests of the school.96
* A high school teacher did not have a First Amendment right to
select a controversial play to be performed by students in her ad-
vanced acting class. Neither the selection of the play by the teacher
nor the editing of the play by the principal presented a matter of pub-
lic concern; thus, this situation was nothing more than an ordinary
employment dispute.9 7
e A track coach's remarks to track athlete about benefits of caf-
feine did not address a matter of public concern, but only the private
concern of enhancing the student's performance. And, assuming that
remarks did touch on a matter of public concern, the school district's
interests outweighed those of the coach's.9 S
* Refusing to assign a passing grade to a student as directed by
the principal was a private matter, not a matter of public concern;
thus, the refusal was not a principle of academic freedom protected by
the First Amendment.99
* A teacher's posting of a pamphlet on his classroom door was not
constitutionally protected. Given the school context, a pamphlet
warning about book banning was not speech on a matter of public con-
cern; instead, the pamphlet was part of the school's curriculum. Also,
because of the control exercised by the school, the school had not es-
tablished a public forum for such postings.lOO
In one decision, a court of appeals did assume that a teacher's in
school criticism of an educational program touched on matters of pub-
95. See Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 1999).
96. See Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989).
97. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998).
98. See Schul v. Sherard, 102 F. Supp. 2d 877, 886 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
99. See Bates v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 952 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App. 1997).
100. See Newton v. Slye, 116 F. Supp. 2d 677 (W.D. Va. 2000).
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lic concern. But victory on this threshold issue did not lead to a final
decision in favor of the teacher.
e Giving a student teacher the benefit of the doubt, the court
treated his conduct and expressions of opprobrium as involving mat-
ters of public concern that required a balancing of interests. But,
where a student teacher elected a mode of communication - audible
denigration and visible petulance in the learning environment, in
front of students and others - that plainly conflicted with the school's
legitimate interest in requiring full participation in the designated
curriculum, the constitutional balance tipped sharply in the school's
favor.10 1
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
A review of the cases discussed above suggests that there is in fact
some level of First Amendment protection - modest though it may be -
accorded to the "academic expression" of public school teachers in
their schools and classrooms. If this were not so, then courts would
not find it necessary to engage in discussions about school officials
having satisfied a test of reasonableness or having addressed a legiti-
mate pedagogical concern.1 0 2
Nevertheless, school boards and administrators do retain consider-
able legal power to regulate what teachers do and say in their class-
rooms. If this were not so, then much administrative supervision and
evaluation of teachers would be pointless. But prudent school officials
must acknowledge the professional expertise that teachers bring to
their task and extend to them at least some freedom to make individ-
ual judgments about the exact curriculum to be followed, the instruc-
tional materials to be utilized, and the teaching techniques to be
employed.
As schools officials exercise their authority over teachers in regard
to their teaching activities, they need to be aware that constitutional
protections - both substantive and procedural - do sometimes come
into play. Several basic principles should be noted.
* School officials should enforce reasonable expectations about
what teachers do and say in their classrooms.
* School officials should have policies and procedures in place that
provide teachers with adequate notice of any regulations of their class-
room teaching activities.
* School officials should not succumb to political pressures that
may be brought to bear because of teaching content or methodology,
101. See Hennessy v. City of Melrose, 194 F.3d 237, 247-48 (1st Cir. 1999).
102. Given the minimal First Amendment rights available, employment contracts and
tenure laws provide teachers more legal protection than do constitutional princi-
ples of "freedom of expression" or "academic freedom."
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which while educational sound, may be controversial in the
community.
0 School officials should be prepared to offer a reasonable educa-
tional justification for any action they choose to take in regard to a
teacher's academic expression.
A teacher's "academic freedom" in K-12 schools, as grounded in the
First Amendment, is more myth than reality. Clearly, school officials
have great constitutional latitude to regulate a teacher's academic ex-
pression in the school environment. But school boards and adminis-
trators must always be mindful that what is legally permissible may
not always be educationally sound. Their rhetoric about the profes-
sionalism of teachers must be matched by their respect for the unique
talents that teachers bring to their classrooms.
